No, Malaysia is not moving away from the West
Originally published in The Strategist
Australia should understand that, from Malaysia’s perspective, being closer to China does not mean moving away from Australia or the West. Premier Anwar Ibrahim’s pro-China statements should be no cause for alarm.
Misinterpreting Anwar’s actions as pro-China could provoke unnecessary tension between Australia and Malaysia and thereby weaken regional security and prosperity, not least because the two countries are partners in the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA).
Writing in The Strategist, Euan Graham judges that Anwar is leaning towards China and away from the West, implying that Malaysia will be less reliable as Australia’s security partner, at least while the prime minister remains in office. Evidence includes frequent statements by Anwar and his ministers that would be agreeable to China and an absence of criticism of it.
In fact, the Anwar government’s engagement style with Beijing does not differ much from that of previous Malaysian administrations.
In 2021, when AUKUS was announced, then-Malaysian defence minister Hishammuddin Hussein stated his intention to consult Beijing about the matter. Incidentally, Anwar led the opposition party that criticised Hishammuddin for doing so. In 2016, Malaysia bought China-built warships under the premiership of Najib Razak, taking itself close to China in defence relations.
Further back, in 1974, Malaysia was the first among the five founding members of the Association of South East Asian Nations to establish diplomatic relations with China.
Given this history of close engagement, how should Australia view Malaysia’s more recent approaches towards China?
The answer lies in Malaysia’s strategic culture. Like other Southeast Asian states, Malaysia does not view its strategic environment through a binary lens. It chooses to work closely with China on specific issues and cooperate with the United States on others. Malaysia considers it possible to move closer to China without distancing itself from Australia or the West.
In its dealings with China, Malaysia prefers to adopt quiet diplomacy—a careful approach that acknowledges its limited resources in the face of China’s military might and seeks to avoid an escalation of tensions. Senior Malaysian politicians and diplomats have privately said they have resisted China behind closed doors when they thought it was threatening their nation’s interests.
Australia should know that Malaysia’s security concerns do not conflict with Australia’s. The two are aligned. Malaysian defence officials have privately said that they consider China’s military build-up and excessive maritime claims in the South China Sea to be significant security threats. Thus, Malaysia is bolstering its defence capabilities in East Malaysia, the part of the country that is closest to China’s claims in the South China Sea. Furthermore, senior officials have privately welcomed the United States’ role in countering China, indicating a shared understanding of security challenges.
In any reappraisal of Malaysia–Australia relations, it must be remembered that not only Malaysia benefits from strong bilateral ties; Australia does too. It is through the Malaysian air base at Butterworth that Australia has a military foothold in the region, conducting surveillance operations that cover parts of the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia. Australia gained access to the base through Malaysia’s goodwill, which was in turn nurtured by Australian diplomacy.
Australia should also consider that its economic prosperity benefits indirectly from its military assistance to Malaysia. A safe and secure maritime environment is critical for Australia, as 99 percent of commodities that enter or leave the country do so by sea. The Royal Malaysian Navy, which trains with Australia in FPDA exercises, patrols the Straits of Malacca and the Sulu Sea, two critical waterways in the region.
Australia would be unwise to turn its focus away from Malaysia. Beijing would likely exploit any vacuum to assert its influence, as it did with Cambodia when the US reduced its engagement.
In its approach to the region as a whole, Australia must be uniform in its actions and words and project a coherent foreign policy. It has assessed that Southeast Asia is critical for its security, as outlined most recently in the 2023 Defence Strategic Review and the 2020 Defence Strategic Update. So its foreign policy must give the region a corresponding level of priority. Australia must invest in diplomacy and defence relations with the region.
