On Wednesday, Thailand’s powerful constitutional court dismissed the country’s prime minister. Srettha Thavisin was found to have appointed a cabinet minister with a criminal conviction in violation of the Thai constitution. Rather than leaving it to Thai voters at the next election to pass judgement on Srettha’s decision – having bubbled away in local politics for some months – the court found that he had violated the constitutional ethics code and removed him from office.
Thai voters rarely get a chance to pass judgement on the parties and prime ministers they elected. In 2008, a prime minister was ordered to resign for a conflict interest arising from appearances on a cooking show. In 2014, the court dismissed Yingluck Shinawatra, sister of former prime minister and powerbroker Thaksin Shinawatra, also for personnel decisions she made in office.
The role of Thailand’s so-called “independent institutions” including the constitutional court was entrenched in the constitution adopted by the post-coup regime in 2017. This constitution has so far been effective in thwarting the will of Thai voters and ensuring that elected governments remain weak and under the control of conservative forces above parliament.
Srettha himself was a minor figure. A businessman by background, he came to office in 2023 as part of a deal between Thaksin and the rump of conservative politicians who remained in parliament after having ruled Thailand outright from 2014 to 2023. After Thaksin was released from hospital prison in February this year, Srettha appeared even more marginal, lacking political authority or a clear governing agenda. Even before he was removed from office, he would not have made it onto a clear-eyed list of the country’s ten most powerful people.
Thailand’s next government will look much the same. Its voice internationally will matter less.
The prime minister’s dismissal may be a warning sign to Thaksin and the Pheu Thai Party that conservative forces are still in charge in Thailand. But for now, it does not seem to signify that this coalition of convenience between Thaksin and conservatives is falling apart. Apart from anything else, the dissolution of the progressive opposition party Move Forward last week means that Pheu Thai Party does not have other good options for governing partners.
Another weak prime minister will succeed Srettha. If Pheu Thai wants to keep the prime minister position in its hands, the 75-year-old Chaikasem Nitisiri may be the most likely candidate, despite persistent rumours of poor health. Another option would be power-broker Anutin Charnvirakul, whose transactional “middle man” status puts him in good standing with all parties in the coalition.
Regardless of who succeeds Srettha, Thailand’s next government will look much the same: unstable, beholden to conservative forces above the parliament and unable to make meaningful economic or political changes. Its voice internationally will matter less.
