Prussian military officer and theorist Carl von Clausewitz once wrote, “surprise lies at the foundation of all undertakings without exception, only in very different degrees according to the nature of the undertaking and other circumstances.” Through their incursion into Russia’s Kursk region over the last fortnight, Ukraine’s armed forces have shown that surprise still has a major role to play in war.
Modern military operations are far less transparent than some would have us believe. Surprise and successful offensive operations remain possible.
The term “transparent battlefield” has been used a lot in describing the war in Ukraine. It is an unfortunate term because it is inaccurate. We may be able to see much more, but visibility is not the same as understanding or wisdom. No satellite, spy plane or drone can see into the minds of commanders or the hearts of combatants to assess their morale.
Afghanistan was one of the most closely watched battlefields in human history, yet American and allied forces were still frequently surprised during the two-decade campaign there. The same has occurred in Ukraine. Regardless of the advanced technologies that inform and speed up decision-making in military affairs, surprise remains one of the enduring elements of strategic competition and conflict.
In the past century, surprise has been at the heart of all major wars. Pearl Harbour, the Arab attacks on Israel in 1973, the 9/11 attacks on America and the 7 October 2023 Hamas attacks on southern Israel all achieved surprise. Surprise can occur in peacetime as well, as events such as the Chinese security agreement with the Solomon Islands demonstrate.
If the Australian government, the Australian Defence Force and various national security agencies are to learn from surprise in modern war, they must ask: how did Ukraine achieve its recent surprise against Russia at this point in the war?
It is likely that the Ukrainian surprise against the Russians was the result of five factors: good intelligence, Ukrainian deception measures, Ukrainian operational security, timing, and a Russian failure of humility.
Good Intelligence
Intelligence is a foundational element of military operations. It underpins all planning as well as the conduct of operations. Ukrainians have an intimate knowledge of Russian doctrine, methods and culture. Its intelligence services are also effective at collecting information from an array of military, foreign military and commercial sources, and then combining it into a “meshed intelligence picture”.
Deception
Deception operations have a long history in military affairs, and the Ukrainians have clearly not forgotten it. Throughout this war, Ukraine has sought to use tactical, operational and strategic deception to protect its forces and plans. Over the past few months, the Ukrainians obviously developed a comprehensive deception plan designed to protect its intention to conduct a major offensive, the locations and movement of forces and the location where the Ukrainian offensive would be conducted.
Operational security
Achieving surprise also demands operational security, which begins well before an operation. This will have been designed by the Ukrainians to deny Russia knowledge of Ukraine’s operations, but also involved limiting the amount of information Ukraine shared with key supporters, such as the United States.
Timing
Timing for the Kursk operation will have been influenced by Ukraine's ability to concentrate its forces: close combat, engineering, artillery, air defence, communications, logistics, and electronic warfare. Ukraine has also shaped expectations among its supporters and the Russian military leadership that any major Ukrainian offensive would not be possible before 2025. Ukraine acted much, much earlier than expected, which is a terrific way to achieve surprise.
Failure of humility
A final element of Ukraine’s ability to achieve surprise in Kursk might be a Russian failure of humility. This happen when a military force fails to undertake sufficient intellectual efforts to understand its adversary or under-estimates it. Russia has had the strategic initiative for most of 2024 and has failed to give the Ukrainians adequate credit for being a thinking and adaptive adversary that was studying them and planning to attack.
Ukraine acted much, much earlier than expected, which is a terrific way to achieve surprise.
These five factors offer insights into the conduct of war in the 21st century. They offer lessons on enduring features of war and how old ideas are influenced by new technologies. They also provide real-time observations critical to adapting and improving the force development, training and education of military institutions like those of the Australian Defence Force.
Importantly, the tactical, operational and strategic surprise generated by Ukraine shows that modern military operations are far less transparent than some would have us believe. Surprise and successful offensive operations remain possible.
This is relevant for contingency planning for military operations in Australia’s region and the broader Pacific theatre. Both China and North Korea are watching Ukraine’s operation in Kursk and sifting through its lessons. Both countries, because they are active supporters of the Russian war effort, are certain to eventually receive Russian intelligence about how Ukraine achieved such a major tactical, strategic and political surprise against Russia.
The Kursk offensive is a reminder of the enduring power of surprise. Prudence suggests that Australia needs be prepared for similar attempts at surprise in coming years.
Photo via Flickr user Tom Murray.
