“Third time’s the charm,” screamed Indonesian and foreign media after Prabowo Subianto finally clinched victory. Twice Prabowo had lost to Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, yet Prabowo was welcomed into the fold by Jokowi following the 2019 trouncing. He was given the role as defence minister in what now has raised the eyebrow of sceptics as a quid pro quo for selecting Jokowi’s eldest son Gibran Rakabuming Raka as his vice presidential running mate.
The expected victory – in the range of an enormous 60 per cent of the vote, with results yet to be finalised – belies that until recently, this election had been widely expected to be the first of two rounds. The other two tickets, former Jakarta governor Anies Baswedan and Muhaimin Iskandar, and former Central Java governor Ganjar Pranowo and Mahfud MD, had hoped to force a June runoff. Prabowo instead has strode ahead.
International reaction to Prabowo’s victory was quick to highlight his shady human rights record as a military commander as well as what his victory might mean for Indonesia’s democracy.
Still, addressing ecstatic supporters in Senayan on Wednesday night, he vowed to govern for all Indonesians and promised a coalition that reflects the country: “This victory should be the victory for all Indonesians. We will assemble a government consisting of the best sons and daughters of Indonesia.”
But the domestic politicking has just as quickly taken hold. Ganjar polled abysmally, unlikely to climb higher than the mid-teens, but the PDI-P party he fronted did better in the House of Representatives and looks likely to return for another term as the dominant party. Party leaders have already floated the idea that widespread electoral fraud has taken place and, rightly, pointed to ethics issues emanating from the Widodo clan. But this shouldn’t be an excuse for the party not to turn its critical view inward as well. The Ganjar campaign was wildly incapable of battling Jokowi and appeared at times to not even try. Gubernatorial elections due nationwide in November should give the party an opportunity to revive its national standing and perhaps introduce new figures into a future presidential candidate milieu.
Prabowo has been a constant in Indonesian political life for decades – yet what he does with the presidency is largely an unknown. Much of the campaign focused on continuing the programs and policies of Jokowi. How long this sticks as he gets comfortable in the job will be closely watched. He has been accused of many things over the years, but never of having his strings easily pulled.
His foreign policy priorities are equally opaque. Jokowi has been mostly content to lean on the highly capable Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi, allowing Jokowi to focus on the domestic programs that had propelled his support. Prabowo’s military background and personal interest in defence expansion should signal a shift.
Prabowo’s now infamous appearance at last year’s Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore may be instructive. Speaking to an audience of defence minister colleagues and the security community, he suggested a referendum on what he dubbed the “various disputed areas” of Ukraine, along with the establishment of a United Nations-administered demilitarised zone of 15 kilometres from the forward lines, and pledging Indonesian troops as part of an international monitoring force. His comments were roundly rejected as an effective surrender and drew a clarification from officials in Jakarta.
This apparent off-the-cuff musing could become an issue closer to home. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations has been effectively neutralised on the South China Sea disputes over China’s “nine-dash line”, for example, which has seen Vietnam and the Philippines go their own way for security. Where Indonesia will fit under a Prabowo presidency remains a question mark. The flashpoint was featured only briefly during a January debate between the candidates, and Prabowo’s response focused primarily on building up maritime defence capacity rather than the peace and diplomatic strategies mused over by the other two candidates.
On US-China rivalry, Prabowo is widely expected to maintain Indonesia’s long history of non-alignment. But whether that looks like Jokowi’s tenure, in which Chinese investment was courted and US relations were fairly constant, or becomes more abrasive as he is tested, will be a close watch. Prabowo has been previously exposed for having a temper.
For Australia, always desperately trying to cultivate ever stronger links with Jakarta, Prabowo will be challenging. The Jokowi years got off to a bad start with the execution of Bali Nine ringleaders Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukumaran in 2015, but in the years since, Australia enjoyed a decade of relatively inoffensive Jokowi presidency, allowing a message of consistently strengthening ties. A falling out in 2018 over a proposed move for Australia’s embassy in Israel never matched the heat of the 2013 spying scandal during the Yudhoyono years or earlier tensions over asylum seeker boat arrivals. But the image of shaking hands with Prabowo as president will raise old spectres for the Albanese government, given the incoming president had been banned from visiting Australia right up to 2014 over alleged human rights abuses. He doesn’t appear opposed to AUKUS – that might be a relief for some in Canberra. But his checkered past might resonate more with the broader Australian community.
